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Equality of when?
Giorgos Galanis and Roberto Veneziani∗
This paper analyses the temporal unit of egalitarian con-
cern. In the intertemporal context, the differences be-
tween egalitarian views can be appreciated not only in
inequality analysis but also as regards the ideal egalitar-
ian distribution to be established. In this paper, three in-
tergenerational egalitarian principles (Complete Lives Egal-
itarianism, Corresponding Segments Egalitarianism and Si-
multaneous Segments Egalitarianism) are analysed andCSE
is argued to be the appropriate egalitarian benchmark.
The relations between the three principles and othermoral
ideals, namelymaximin andutilitarianism, are also anal-
ysed. It is proved that CLE and CSE are compatible with
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a concern for the worst off and, partially, with a utilitar-
ian concern, while the adoption of SSE implies a worse
trade-off between egalitarianismand the othermoral ide-
als.
Keywords: Time, inequality, intertemporal setting, the-
ories of justice, difference principle
Égalité de quand ?
Cet article analyse l’unité de temps retenue dans les ana-
lyses égalitaristes. Dans un contexte intertemporel, les
différences entre des visions égalitaristes peuvent s’ap-
précier, non seulement en termes d’analyse des inéga-
lités, mais aussi relativement à la distribution égalitaire
à réaliser. Trois principes d’égalité inter-générationnelle
sont analysés dans cet article : L’égalitarisme sur toute la
vie (Complete Life Egalitarianism), l’égalitarisme des seg-
ments correspondants (Corresponding Segments Egalita-
rianism) et l’égalitarisme des segments simultanés (Si-
multaneous Segments Egalitarianism). On défend le deux-
ième principe (CSE) comme critère approprié. On ana-
lyse également la relation entre les trois principes et d’au-
tres idéaux moraux, soit le maximin et l’utilitarisme. On
démontre que les principes de CLE et CSE sont com-
patibles avec une préoccupation pour les plus démunis,
et partiellement compatibles avec une approche utilita-
riste. En revanche, l’adoption du principe de SSE impose
un compromis entre l’égalitarisme et les autres idéaux
moraux.
Mots clés : temps, inégalités, cadre intertemporel, théo-
ries de la justice, principe de différence
JEL: D63; C61
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The publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) has
marked a renewal of interest in egalitarian theories, and has
sparked a large literature. One of the central issues of con-
tention has been the choice of the appropriate equalisandum:
income, wealth, utility, primary goods or, more recently, ca-
pabilities, functionings, and opportunities. As Amartya Sen
(1980) forcefully put it, one of the central questions for egali-
tarians raised by Rawls’ theory, and by his forceful criticism of
utility as the relevant equalisandum, is equality of what?
The analysis of the appropriate unit of egalitarian concern–
and indeed other debates on the foundations of egalitarian the-
ory following Rawls’ seminal contribution—has been carried
out in themainwithin the confines of an essentially static envi-
ronment. The choice of the appropriate equalisandum, for ex-
ample, has been explored abstracting from the time structure
of individual lives and focusing on a single generation (e.g.,
Sen, 1980; Dworkin, 1981a; 1981b; Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989;
Roemer, 1998). Similarly, the analysis of different measures of
inequality has typically focused on the distribution of the rel-
evant variable in a single period (e.g., Sen, 1973; 1992; Temkin,
1993).
To be sure, time anddynamics have played a significant role
in egalitarian debates. Many empirical studies have analysed
the dynamics of inequality over time or across generations, and
the intergenerational and intertemporal impact of different dis-
tributive policies. Theoretically, a large literature has emerged
on intergenerational justice and the evaluation of infinite util-
ity streams,1 and the issues that a dynamic approach poses to
egalitarianism, including the trade-offs between distribution
and growth, have been highlighted almost immediately after
the publication of A Theory of Justice.2
Yet, even when distributive dynamics, growth and time
1 For a discussion see Mariotti et al. (2012) and Lombardi et al. (2016).
2 See, for example, the classic papers by Arrow (1973) and Dasgupta
(1974). For a more recent discussion see Roemer and Veneziani (2004,
2007).
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have been considered, the complex economic and philosophi-
cal implications of the fact that agents’ lives develop over time
have often been overlooked by focusing either on the analysis
of a sequence of time slices (e.g., in the analysis of the evolution
of income distribution over time) or by implicitly assuming
that the relevant unit of distributive concern can be reduced to
a single variable measuring the lifetime attainment of the rele-
vant equalisandum. As Milton Friedman (1957, 38) famously
put it, “the identification of low measured income with ‘poor’
and high measured income with ‘rich’ is justified only if mea-
sured income can be regarded as an estimate of expected in-
come over a lifetime or a large fraction thereof”. A similar view
is held by most political and moral philosophers: “the subject
of an egalitarian principle is not the distribution of particular
rewards to individuals at some time, but the prospective qual-
ity of their lives as a whole, from birth to death” (Nagel , 1991,
69).
In a seminal article, Dennis McKerlie (1989) questioned the
standard view—defined as complete lives egalitarianism (CLE)—
according towhich agents’ lives, taken as awhole, are the prop-
er unit of egalitarian concern. For, McKerlie argued, CLE is in-
sensitive to inequalities occurring within particular segments
of agents’ lives, no matter how severe such inequalities are,
provided they cancel out over the course of agents’ lives. He
suggested that egalitarians focus instead on inequalities occur-
ring between contemporaries at a given time—a view called si-
multaneous segments egalitarianism (SSE). More generally, McK-
erlie (1989) argued that because agents’ lives extend over time,
a sound egalitarian analysis requires the definition of the proper
unit of egalitarian concern, i.e. whole lives or selected parts of
them. Egalitarian principles based on different temporal units
incorporate different moral concerns and have different policy
implications.
The issues raised by McKerlie (1989) are deep, go beyond
the boundaries of liberal egalitarian approaches, and have
sparked a growing literature across the disciplinary borders of
philosophy and economics.3 Veneziani (2007, 2013) has shown,
3 See, for example, Temkin (1992, 1993); Kappel (1997); McKerlie
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for example, that the temporal structure of individual lives has
relevant implications in exploitation theory: a capitalist econ-
omy in which individuals switch roles over time so that every-
one is exploited for an equal amount of time is not necessarily a
just economy. Moreover, according to various authors, the fact
that individual lives are structured into normatively relevant
segments raises difficult, if not intractable issues for egalitari-
anism.
In a series of contributions, for example, Temkin (1992,
1993) has analysed the three main intertemporal egalitarian
principles, namely CLE, SSE and also corresponding segments
egalitarianism (CSE),which holds that inequalitiesmust bemea-
sured between corresponding stages of agents’ lives—e.g.,
childhood, middle age, old age, etc. According to him, in the
analysis of inequalities no principle is entirely satisfactory:
“several views are possible, each of which seems plausible in
some cases and implausible in others” (Temkin , 1993, 291). In-
deed, the absence of a single approach properly capturing egal-
itarian views suggests that we should reconsider our intuitions
and acknowledge that equality is inevitably a complex notion.
Somuch so that itmay sometimes be difficult to formulate clear
and consistent egalitarian considered judgements.4
Kappel (1997) has taken Temkin’s (1992; 1993) conclusion
further, suggesting that we should actually abandon egalitari-
anism. In his view, none of the egalitarian views is completely
satisfactory because it is normatively irrelevant and even mis-
leading to compare the relative attainments of the relevant vari-
able across individuals. Once we consider the temporal struc-
ture of individual lives, it becomes clear that “what matters in
our egalitarian judgement is giving priority to the worse off”
(Kappel, 1997, 204).
More radically, Huemer (2003) has argued that the conflict-
(2001a,b, 2012); Huemer (2003); Carter (2006); Attas (2008); and Bidada-
nure (2015).
4 A similar point is made by Attas (2008), who argues that the tempo-
ral structure of agents’ lives creates some fundamental indeterminacies for
egalitarian principles in the Rawlsian tradition whichmakes them virtually
empty.
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ing intuitions arising in the intertemporal context reveal a deep
conceptual problem for egalitarianism. According to him, once
we acknowledge that individual lives are divided into tempo-
ral stages, egalitarianism cannot be coherently defined: intu-
itions concerning complete lives and about temporal segments
inevitably conflict leading to inconsistencies.
This paper analyses the issues that time and the temporal
structure of individual lives pose in normative economics, and
in particular for egalitarianism. To be specific, we reconsider
the three main intertemporal egalitarian principles proposed
in the literature in order to identify the appropriate temporal
unit of egalitarian concern—that is, to answer the question posed
in the title: equality of when?5 We argue that, although crit-
ics have highlighted some important and often neglected is-
sues, their arguments do not pose any intractable problems
for egalitarians.6 It may be true that no principle fully cap-
tures our egalitarian intuitions when evaluating inequalities,
but this does not mean that egalitarianism is incoherent or that
no satisfactory egalitarian benchmark can be defined.
Indeed, we argue that an important distinction has been
overlooked in the literature, which is a peculiar feature of the
intertemporal context. Unlike in the static setting, apart from
differing in the analysis of unequal distributions, intertempo-
ral egalitarian principles also define different egalitarian states
to reach. The two issues are connected but they should be kept
conceptually distinct in the choice of the appropriate principle.
This is even more evident for policy purposes,—e.g., from the
5 To be sure, CLE, CSE and SSE do not exhaust the set of logically con-
ceivable intertemporal egalitarian views. Yet they do capture themost com-
mon egalitarian considered judgements. Lippert-Rasmussen (2003), for
example, considers also ranking-order segments egalitarianism according to
which egalitarian evaluations should be based on the comparison of equiv-
alent rank-order segments of individual lives—that is, the best segment,
the second-best segment, and so on—in terms of the attainment of the rele-
vant variable. However, the ethical foundations of this approach are rather
unclear.
6 We focus in particular on the arguments advanced by Temkin (1992,
1993) and Kappel (1997). For a thorough critical analysis of Huemer’s
(2003) argument, see Carter (2006).
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viewpoint of a government concerned with equality,—since
the definition of the ideal “steady-state” egalitarian distribu-
tion and the design of the transition process to that state raise
different problems. In order to implement an egalitarian strat-
egy, in addition to a correct analysis of the status quo, it is nec-
essary to define the appropriate egalitarian benchmark.
This paper focuses on the latter issue. Section 1 briefly re-
views the main results of the existing literature on the proper-
ties of the three egalitarian views in the evaluation of unequal
distributions. Then, the distinction between the evaluation of
existing inequalities and the definition of the appropriate egal-
itarian distribution is introduced, and it is argued that, as re-
gards the distribution to establish, CSE defines the appropriate
intertemporal egalitarian benchmark.
Because the evaluation of a distribution, e.g., for policy pur-
poses, is influenced by more than one normative concern, in
section 2, a formal analysis of the trade-offs between the dif-
ferent egalitarian principles and other normative views is pre-
sented, which aims to provide a formal basis for all things con-
sidered judgements (Temkin, 1993). The relation of CLE, CSE,
and SSE with two non-primarily egalitarian normative con-
cerns, Rawls’s difference principle and utility,7 are analysed. A
stylised model is set up, which generalises Arrow (1973) and
Dasgupta (1974) by considering overlapping generations, so
that at each date there are two types of individual, young and
old, rather than a representative agent. This allows us to anal-
yse intertemporal as well as intratemporal equality. It is proved
that the maximin solution yields CSE and CLE, but not SSE,
and if the assumptions of the model are relaxed, CLE remains
the egalitarian principle that can best accommodate Rawlsian
or utilitarian concerns, and it is easier to reconcile these con-
cerns with CSE than with SSE.
Finally, it is worth noting that our formal analysis yields
some interesting insights on a vexed issue in normative eco-
nomics, namely the well-known trade-off between Rawlsian
distributive justice and growth. For we show that, once the
7 For a discussion of the relation between the maximin and egalitarian-
ism, see Temkin (1993).
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temporal structure of individual lives is explicitly modelled,
then contrary to Arrow’s (1973) and Dasgupta’s (1974) classic
papers, the dynamics of the economy is not completely station-
ary, even though the application of the maximin principle pre-
cludes permanent growth. We briefly elaborate on this point
in the concluding section. The proofs of all formal results are
relegated to the Appendix.
1 Three Egalitarian Principles Compared
Let x be the relevant equalisandum, which shall be called ‘wel-
fare’ (x could be income, utility, opportunities, primary goods,
etc.). Assume that agents’ lives can be divided into an equal
number T of well-defined periods of equal length. Let X(T ) =
{xti = (x
t
i1, x
t+1
i2 , . . . , x
t+T−1
iT )} ⊆ R
T be the set of vectors describ-
ing the attainment of xt+j−1ij by agent i in period j, 1 ≤ j ≤ T
of her life, at date t + j − 1, where t is the date of birth of i.
For the sake of simplicity, assume x to be interpersonally and
intertemporally comparable, and additive along agents’ lives,
so that xti =
∑T
j=1 x
t+j−1
ij is the lifetime attainment of x by agent
i born in t. These assumptions make the analysis comparable
with McKerlie (1989) and Temkin (1993) and they are quite
natural if x is a variable such as income or an index of primary
goods. On the other hand, if a subjective variable like utility
is considered, these assumptions give the opportunity to com-
pare the egalitarian principles in vitro, as a first step towards a
more satisfactory and realistic analysis.
The three egalitarian principles can be interpreted as differ-
ent ways of evaluating distributions of the xti vectors. Let D1,
D2 and D3 denote inequality measures associated with CLE,
CSE, and SSE, respectively. Formally, Dy : X(T ) × ... ×X(T ) →
R+ for y = 1, 2, 3. If Dy = 0, then a distribution is egalitarian
according to the relevant principle y = 1, 2, 3. Given the def-
initions in the previous section, D1 = 0 if and only if x
t
i = x
τ
h
for all agents i, h and dates of birth t, τ ; D2 = 0 if and only if
xt+j−1ij = x
τ+j−1
hj for all agents i, h, dates t + j − 1, τ + j − 1,
and corresponding life stages j; and D3 = 0 if and only if
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 7(1): 25-59
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xt+j−1ij = x
τ+z−1
hz for all agents i, h, life stages j, z and simul-
taneous dates t+ j − 1 = τ + z − 1.
In order to focus on the implications of the three egalitarian
principles,—rather than on the features of specificmeasures,—
no further restrictions are imposed on theDy’s. As in the static
setting, where the problems of inequality measurement are re-
flected into the existence of several measures capturing differ-
ent aspects of inequality (e.g., Gini index, Atkinson’s measure,
etc.; see Temkin, 1993) in principle there are many possible
ways of measuring inequalities according to each criterion, that
is, there are various specifications of everyDy. Actually, in the
intertemporal context the choice of the appropriate inequality
measure associated to each criterion ismore complex, since the
Dy’s should rank distributions of vectors rather than distribu-
tions of real numbers.
As convincingly argued by Temkin (1993), however, one of
the specific features of intertemporal analysis is that, unlike in
the atemporal context, even assuming a unique possibleDy as-
sociated to each principle, the issue of inequalitymeasurement
would not be solved: different egalitarian principles highlight
different kinds of inequalities and no principle, CLE, CSE, or
SSE, seems completely satisfactory in the analysis of unequal
distributions.
ThemainproblemofCLE is that it leads to “changingplaces
egalitarianism” (McKerlie , 1989). If whole lives are the unit of
egalitarian concern, in a “situation involving differential treat-
ment of equally deserving people—no matter how significant,
... and even perverse those differing treatments are—there can
be no egalitarian objection as long as the roles of the equally de-
serving people are interchanged so that each receives an equiv-
alent share of the treatments meted out” (Temkin, 1993, 236).
According to CLE, for example, an allocation where
xti = (5, 5, 5, 5), for each agent i in a setN = {1, 2, ...N} born in
t, is equivalent to the following distribution:8
8 In all examples in this section, we suppose that agents’ lives are divided
into four stages, so that T = 4. This is only for concreteness and yields no
loss of generality.
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 7(1): 25-59
10 Giorgos Galanis and Roberto Veneziani |
Example 1.
x
t
i = (10, 10, 0, 0), for all agents i ∈ N , with i odd,
x
t
i = (0, 0, 10, 10), for all agents i ∈ N , with i even.
It may be objected that it is difficult to judge the distribution
in Example 1without additional contextual considerations. For
instance, an anonymous referee has argued that Example 1 does
not necessarily involve “differential treatment of equally de-
serving people” if the different intertemporal distributions re-
flect the free optimizing choices of fully rational adults based
on equal ex ante endowments. This objection raises a norma-
tively crucial issue concerning the role of circumstances and re-
sponsibility in egalitarian theories, but it does not really ques-
tion our conclusion. For we have left the equalisandum x un-
specified and therefore “changing places egalitarianism”, and
Example 1, continue to hold ifx is interpreted as primary goods,
or endowments, or more generally resources that are beyond
the agents’ control.9 In fact, in order to clearly separate the
analysis of the appropriate intertemporal egalitarian bench-
mark from the issue of the appropriate currency of egalitarian
concern, all of our examples can be interpreted as capturing
the choices of a social planner, consistently with a standard so-
cial choice theoretic perspective and the analysis developed in
section 2 below.
CSE and SSE rule out changing places egalitarianism in-
sofar as they do not allow present inequalities to compensate
for past ones: in Example 1, bothD2 andD3 would be different
from zero. Yet, they do not represent entirely satisfactory alter-
natives in the evaluation of unequal distributions. By focusing
only on inequalities in selected portions of agents’ lives, both
principles can lead to the paradoxical conclusion that a distri-
bution exhibiting changing places egalitarianism is as objec-
tionable as one in which the agents’ roles are not interchanged
and one agent isworse off in every relevant segment, as the next
example shows:
9 See, for example, Sen (1980); Dworkin (1981a,b); Arneson (1989); Co-
hen (1989) and Roemer (1998).
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Example 2. Consider again the set of agentsN = {1, 2, ...N} born in t:
x
t
i = (10, 10, 10, 10), for all agents i ∈ N , with i odd,
x
t
i = (0, 0, 0, 0), for all agents i ∈ N , with i even.
Althoughwe have not imposed any restrictions on themea-
suresDy when evaluating unequal distributions, under a large
set of reasonable functional specifications—includingmost no-
tably the additive specifications typically (albeit often implic-
itly) used in the literature (see, e.g., Bidadanure, 2016)—accord-
ing toD2 andD3, the latter distributionwould be as unequal as
that in Example 1. Hence, Temkin (1993, 291) concludes that in
the evaluation of existing inequalities, “several views are possi-
ble, each of which seems plausible in some cases and implausi-
ble in others”, and it may be opportune to use the information
conveyed by all principles rather than focusing only on one of
them.
It may be objected that the distribution in Example 1 is egal-
itarian and we find it intuitively objectionable because it fails
on other criteria, e.g. fraternity (equality between contempo-
raries promotes feelings of solidarity), or welfare (because of
diminishing marginal utility).10 It is difficult to address this
objection without more information on the nature of x and on
the meaning of the welfare levels in Example 1. But, granting
that information on the temporal structure of the attainment
of x is at least prima facie relevant, then one may argue that
the distribution in Example 1 is not equivalent to one in which
xti = (5, 5, 5, 5), for all i, and agents in Example 1 are not equally
treated.
We need not adjudicate this issue here. For, even granting
the relevance of changing places egalitarianism, we argue that
this does not raise intractable problems for egalitarians. The
key point to note is that Temkin’s (1993) (and indeed Kappel’s
1997) arguments do not extend to the choice of the appropri-
ate intertemporal egalitarian benchmark, which is quite a differ-
ent issue from the analysis of past and present inequalities. In
10 We are grateful to Robert Sugden for this suggestion.
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the static context, while the measurement of inequalities can
be controversial, the definition of egalitarian states is uncon-
troversial: different inequality measures give the same answer
if the distribution is egalitarian—that is, when all agents at-
tain the same level of the relevant variable x.11 In contrast, in
the intertemporal context, it is misleading to say that differ-
ent views can “be regarded as built around ways of measuring
the inequality between lives” (McKerlie , 1989, 487). The three
principles stress different aspects of existing inequalities, but
they also define different egalitarian states to reach, as shown
by the fact that, unlike in the static context, Dy = 0 does not
necessarily imply Dy′ = 0, y 6= y
′. The two issues are con-
nected, but should be kept conceptually distinct in the choice
of the appropriate egalitarian principle.12
The difference between the two perspectives is particularly
evident for policy purposes, since the definition of the ideal
“steady-state” egalitarian distribution and the design of the
transition process to that state raise different issues. In order to
implement an egalitarian strategy, in addition to a correct anal-
ysis of the status quo (involving the evaluation of existing in-
equalities and claims for compensation of past ones), the prop-
er intertemporal egalitarian benchmark must be defined.
This distinction has been largely overlooked in the litera-
ture, and so the scope of the conclusions reached is sometimes
unclear. For example, McKerlie (1989) discusses the choice of
the egalitarian benchmark, but his arguments are basedmainly
on the analysis of the claims for compensation of past inequal-
ities implied by the different views. Similarly, Temkin (1993)
criticises CLE because it entails changing places egalitarianism
but he finds SSE and CSE faulty based on the analysis of un-
equal distributions, which provides little information as to the
features of the egalitarian distributions associated with them.
In the rest of this section, we show that if the distinction is rig-
orously drawn, then even though no principle may fully cap-
11 See, e.g., the measures discussed in Sen (1973, 1992) and in Temkin
(1993, chapter 5).
12 The distinction is also ignored in Lippert-Rasmussen’s (2003) other-
wise insightful analysis.
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ture our egalitarian intuitions when evaluating unequal distri-
butions, this does not mean that egalitarianism is incoherent
or that no satisfactory egalitarian benchmark can be defined.
Consider the three principles from the point of view of the
distributions with Dy = 0, y = 1, 2, 3. As noted above, chang-
ing places egalitarianism may raise doubts on CLE as the in-
tertemporal egalitarian benchmark. SSE is not a satisfactory
alternative.
A first puzzling feature of SSE is reflected in the time de-
pendence of D3 and in particular in its sensitivity to small
changes in the agents’ date of birth. Suppose that agents’ lives
are divided into relatively short time periods. Then, it is easy to
construct examples in which for given allocations of x, a “slight”
shift in the date of birth of an agent is sufficient to change dra-
matically the value ofD3 and the egalitarian judgement.
13 How-
ever, it is hard to see why if an agent is born, say, a fewmonths
later, or earlier, the judgement about an otherwise identical
(and possibly CL- and CS-egalitarian) distribution should
change. This problemmay be partly circumvented by dividing
agents’ lives into longer stages. However, the determination of
the appropriate length of agents’ life stages raises a number
of problems for SSE. For one, a trade-off arises between the ro-
bustness of the results (which tends to increase with the length
of periods) and their relevance (since in the limit only whole
lives matter). For another, as Bidadanure (2016) has forcefully
noted, if the emphasis is on simultaneity then there is no obvi-
ous criterion to choose a relevant finite time span for the nor-
matively relevant simultaneous segment and one could always
advocate the use of shorter segments.14
13 Consider, for example, an economy with N identical agents with the
same, strictly increasing, welfare profile over their lives. If agents are born
on the same date t0 then D3 = 0. If, however, the date of birth of only one
of them is slightly shifted forward, or backward, then D3 becomes strictly
positive and potentially quite large, especially if N is large.
14 Indeed, Bidadanure (2016) has highlighted a conceptually analogous
problem ofD3, which arises from its sensitivity to small changes in the tem-
poral partition of agents’ lives. Thus, for example, it is easy to design exam-
ples in which “depending on whether we register simultaneous inequali-
ties every 20 years or every 10 years, we will draw substantially different
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Second, according to SSE, only inequalities between con-
temporaries are ethically relevant, and thereforeD3 = 0when-
ever agents’ lives do not overlap. However, consider a set of
agentsN = {1, 2, ...N} born at different points in time andwith
the following welfare profiles.
Example 3.
x
t
i = (1, 2, 3, 4), for all agents i ∈ N , and all dates of birth t.
In Example 3, D1 = D2 = 0, while D3 would definitely be
positive. Suppose next that the only available action to reach
D3 = 0 is the construction of a nuclear plant that will explode
in t = 10 yielding the following distribution.15
Example 4.
x
t
i = (t+100, t+101, t+102, t+103), for all agents i ∈ N , born in t ≤ 6,
x
7
i = (107, 108, 109, 0), for all agents i ∈ N , born in t = 7,
x
8
i = (108, 109, 0, 0), for all agents i ∈ N , born in t = 8,
x
9
i = (109, 0, 0, 0), for all agents i ∈ N , born in t = 9,
x
t
i = (0, 0, 0, 0), for all agents i ∈ N , born in t ≥ 10.
According to SSE, if future generations’welfare is uniformly
affected in each period, no other egalitarian consideration is
necessary to evaluate a policy: the distribution in Example 4 is
strictly preferable to that in Example 3 and raises no egalitar-
ian objection. The nuclear plant should be built. This conclu-
sionwould be rejected bymost egalitarians and it raises serious
doubts on SSE as the appropriate egalitarian benchmark.
It is important to note that Example 4 does not represent
a variant of the so-called ‘levelling down objection’, which is
conclusions” (Bidadanure, 2016, 244).
15 An anonymous referee has argued that this premise may be extreme
and therefore raise doubts on the relevance of Example 4. This conclusion
is unwarranted: Example 4 is meant to illustrate some shortcomings of SSE
and a stark scenariomakes themparticularly vivid. Yet the problems of SSE
are structural and the same conclusions can be reached under less extreme
assumptions.
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problematic for all egalitarian principles, includingCLE orCSE.
It is indeedwell-known that the enforcement of any egalitarian
distribution may require a welfare loss. In the above scenario,
what is objectionable is not that SSE leads to a lower welfare
level in Example 4 than in Example 3 but rather that according
to SSE, Example 4 must be considered better than Example 3
from an egalitarian viewpoint.
Examples 3 and 4 also show a more general point: the re-
quirement of CL-equality cannot be abandoned without gen-
erating unappealing results (from an egalitarian perspective).
This suggests that the analysis of intertemporal egalitarian
benchmarks should focus on the choice of the most appropri-
ate restriction on CLE. Indeed, only in the context of inequal-
ity analysis the “views are independent of each other, in the
sense that each of their judgments may be in agreement or
disagreement depending on the particular case in question”
(Temkin, 1993, 242). If egalitarian distributions are analysed,
then it is misleading to ask whether “the whole lives view
[should] be rejected entirely, and replaced by some combina-
tion of the simultaneous and corresponding segments views”
(Temkin, 1993, 238). Neither CSE nor a simultaneous segments
restriction on CLE (discussed below) ‘replaces’ the latter: they
imply it. Actually, in order to avoid changing places egalitari-
anism, any restriction onCLE should require all agents belong-
ing to the same generation to have identical patterns of x dur-
ing their lives. Hence, for a given total amount of welfare xti
equal for all agents i, alternative restrictions will differ only in
the admissible patterns of x for agents born at different dates t
and thus belonging to different generations.
One possibility, suggested byMcKerlie (1989, 484) is to im-
pose SS-equality in addition to CL-equality. We find this pro-
posal unconvincing. This version of SSE (hereafter SSE2) is
subject to the same time-sensitivity problem faced by the un-
constrained SSE (hereafter, SSE1). Moreover, the emphasis
on simultaneity as the relevant egalitarian restriction on the
allocation of x along agents’ lives is not entirely compelling.
SSE2 removes changing places egalitarianism between agents
belonging to the samegeneration, but the requirement of equal-
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ity in the overlapping segments of the lives of agents belong-
ing to different generations seems less convincing. Accord-
ing to SSE2, the distribution in Example 3—in which agents
are treated identically regardless of the generation they belong
to—is definitely non-egalitarian, while the following distribu-
tion is SSE2-egalitarian.
Example 5.
x
t
i = (1, 2, 3, 4), for all agents i ∈ N , born in t = 4d, d = 0, 1, 2, . . .
x
t
i = (2, 3, 4, 1), for all agents i ∈ N , born in t = 1 + 4d, d = 0, 1, 2, . . .
x
t
i = (3, 4, 1, 2), for all agents i ∈ N , born in t = 2 + 4d, d = 0, 1, 2, . . .
x
t
i = (4, 1, 2, 3), for all agents i ∈ N , born in t = 3 + 4d, d = 0, 1, 2, . . .
In Example 5, only agents born every four periods have the
same pattern of attainment of x during their lives. However,
unless agents are assumed to be extremely myopic and to care
only about the inequalities that they can actually observe in ev-
ery t, it is hard to see why a distribution exhibiting such a cycli-
cal pattern—in which welfare is very low in periods 0, 4, 8, . . .
and very high in periods 3, 7, 11, . . .—should be desirable from
an egalitarian perspective, and indeedwhy it should be strictly
preferable to that in Example 3. Notice that the egalitarian intu-
ition behind SSE2 is not the same as that behind SSE1: accord-
ing to SSE1, inequalities between contemporaries are worse
than inequalities between removed generations—e.g., between
the present generation and people living in themiddle age. In-
stead, given the same total level of x, the only role played by
simultaneity in SSE2 is to constrain the allocation of x during
agents’ lives.
Another possibility is to adopt CSE: since the distributions
with D2 = 0 are a strict subset of those with D1 = 0 for all
T > 1, CSE can be naturally interpreted as a restriction on
CLE.16 Moreover, unlikeCLE and SSE2, CSE fully incorporates
the egalitarian intuition that identical agents should be treated
16 If the duration of agents’ lives is uncertain, neither CSE nor SSE2 nec-
essarily implies CLE ex-post, but the above arguments still hold ex-ante, if
applied to expected welfare.
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exactly in the same way, since in CS-egalitarian distributions
they have an identical welfare allocation along their lives. For-
mally, unlike D1 and D3, D2 = 0 if and only if x
t
i = x
τ
h, for all
agents i, h and all dates of birth t, τ that is,D2 = 0 if and only
if the vectors describing the pattern of the egalitarian variable
along agents’ lives are identical. Thus, all distributions in the
class with D2 = 0 can be simply described as follows.
Example 6.
x
t
i = (p, q, r, s), for all agents i ∈ N , and all dates of birth t.
Unlike the distributions withD1 = 0 orD3 = 0,—as chang-
ing places egalitarianism and Example 4 respectively show,—
those belonging to the class with D2 = 0 are equivalent from
an egalitarian point of view, as the comparison of any pair of CS-
egalitarian distributions shows.
It is worth taking stock to summarise our argument here.
Consider different welfare distributions from under a veil of
ignorance, removing all normatively irrelevant information a-
bout personal identities. Equality requires that any agent ran-
domly drawn from the economy be indistinguishable from any
other in the normatively relevant (welfare) dimensions. In the
static framework, every agent is simply defined by her level of x
(a scalar). In an egalitarian distribution, every agent picked up
at random from the economy would indeed be indistinguish-
able from every other agent as they all reach the same level of
x.
In the intertemporal framework, agents are defined by a
vector describing the attainment of x in each period of their
lives. In a CL- or SS-egalitarian distribution, an agent picked
up randomly from the economywould not necessarily be iden-
tical to any other agent. Assuming that all of the information
contained in the vector xti is normatively relevant in principle
(as it is natural to assume in the intertemporal context), under
either CLE or SSE equally deserving agents would not neces-
sarily be treated identically. In contrast, at a CS-egalitarian dis-
tribution any agent randomly drawn from the economywould
have exactly the same vector xti. Discarding the (morally irrele-
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vant) information about birth dates, a CS-egalitarian distribu-
tion indeed implies identical agents.
To be sure, it is not necessarily true that p = q = r = s, and
thus CSE allows potentially great inequalities between people
living in the same period and belonging to different age co-
horts. For instance, a CS-egalitarian distribution could imply
that in every period there are happy young people, while the
elderly live in despair. As noted by an anonymous referee, CSE
permits contemporaneous inequalities across cohorts—so long
as cohorts are treated equally—and one could object to such
unequal treatment on the grounds that age does not provide a
morally legitimate exception to access x in any particular pe-
riod. Three points should be made here to suggest that this
objection is not entirely compelling.
Firstly, however undesirable an unbalanced distribution of
x along agents’ lives may be, if D2 = 0—that is, if, when they
were young, the elderly were treated as the current young—
there should be no egalitarian objection to it, since identical
people have an identical pattern of x during their lives. From
the distributive perspective adopted in this paper, and in most
of the literature, CSE clearly embodies the principle of equal
moralworth of individuals.17 Secondly, it is unclear that a prin-
ciple of ‘no discrimination on the basis of age’ can be defended
in general. There are numerous age-based provisions in mod-
ern legal systems that treat citizens differentially based on age,
and they arewidely consideredmorally sound and in linewith
our normative intuitions. As Daniels notes, concerning health
care: “Since health needs vary with age, and the opportunity
range for people does as well, a scheme that protected age-
relative opportunity range at each stage of life would be treat-
ing people differently by age” (Daniels, 2008, 483). There is no
reason to consider this as an unacceptable form of age bias and
it is difficult to object to such a differential treatment of agents
on egalitarian grounds.18
17 This conclusion may be disputed if one adopts a relational perspective,
as proposed by Bidadanure (2015, 2016). We discuss relational egalitarian-
ism in section 3 below.
18 If identity changed during an agent’s life, there might be an egalitar-
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Thirdly, at least in a distributive perspective, the objection
to the unequal treatment of simultaneous cohorts is likely dri-
ven by intuitions that are outside of the stock of egalitarian
principles. For example, we may object to examples in which
one age group lives in luxury while another leads a miserable
life because we implicitly adopt a sufficientarian view applied
to each segment of agents’ lives, whereby any permissible allo-
cation should be such that all agents attain at least a minimum
level of x in each period of their lives.19 More generally, there
may be many non-egalitarian objections to an unbalanced al-
location of x along agents’ lives and in general, distributions
with D2 = 0 are not equivalent all things considered. For in-
stance, distributions with a higher overall welfare or without
unbalanced welfare allocations along agents’ lives may be pre-
ferred. As shown by Example 6, if CSE is adopted, egalitarian
and non-egalitarian concerns can be clearly distinguished in
the evaluation of a distribution. The former reduce to the re-
quirement xti = x, for all agents i and dates of birth t, while the
latter are related to the features of x, that is, the desirable pat-
tern of the egalitarian variable along agents’ lives. All things
considered a distribution with, say, p ≫ q = r = s may be
rejected because of the unbalanced welfare allocation. How-
ever, this is an argument regarding the welfare pattern along
an agent’s life and not how she fares relative to others and there-
fore it is not an egalitarian reason to reject the distribution. A
smootherwelfare profilewould probably be preferable but this
would be justified on prudential, or utilitarian or maybe suffi-
cientarian grounds.
ian objection to the distribution. However a similar critique can be moved
to any intertemporal egalitarian principle, since it amounts to saying that
the principle is analysed in the wrong context. Once the agents’ identity is
correctly specified, all the arguments in this paper remain valid.
19 See, for example, the approach developed by Gosseries (2014) dis-
cussed in section 3 below.
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2 Egalitarianism, Utility and the
Maximin
In the static context, given the relevant equalisandum, differ-
ent egalitarian views can “be regarded as built around ways of
measuring the inequality between lives” (McKerlie, 1989, 487),
but the egalitarian state to reach is unambiguously defined.
As a result, the differences between the various views in re-
lation to other normative principles can be shown in unequal
distributions, but not if one evaluates the desirability of reach-
ing the common egalitarian state in relation, say, to utilitarian
concerns. This is not true in the intertemporal context: dif-
ferent principles yield different trade-offs between egalitarian
and non-egalitarian concerns also in egalitarian distributions.
Since the evaluation of a distribution is influenced by more
than one ethical concern, it is important to analyse these trade-
offs in a systematic way.
In this section, CLE, CSE, and SSE are analysed in relation
to two non-primarily-egalitarian normative principles, namely
Rawls’s (1971) difference principle and utilitarianism. If, as ar-
gued in section 1, it is appropriate to impose a restriction on
CLE, then it is important to analyse whether this implies a wel-
fare loss, whether different restrictions have different effects on
welfare, and what are the consequences for the worst-off gen-
eration.
The problem is modelled in a stark way. We generalise Ar-
row (1973) and Dasgupta (1974), in which the maximin crite-
rion is examined in a dynamic framework. Society exists for an
infinite number of generations. There is a single good that can
be consumed or invested. Population is stationary and there is
no technical progress. In this section, for the sake of notational
simplicity, let t denote a specific period in time, rather than
the date of birth of an agent. We assume that agents’ welfare
in every period can be captured by a standard utility function
u : R+ → R+. Thus x
t
j = u
t
j = u(c
t
j), where u
t
j denotes the
welfare obtained by agents in the j-th age cohort at date t and
the subscript i denoting different agents belonging to the same
age cohort is dropped in order to focus on intergenerational in-
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equalities. Further, we assume that T = 2 and j = 1, 2 (youth
and old age), and agents have identical additively-separable
utility functions:
W (ct1, c
t+1
2 ) = u(c
t
1) + βu(c
t+1
2 )
where ct1 is consumption of the young in t, c
t+1
2 is the consump-
tion of the elderly in t+ 1, 0 < β ≤ 1 is the subjective discount
factor capturing agents’ time preference and the function u is
normalised such that if an agent does not consume, her utility
is zero u(0) = 0. Furthermore, we assume that u is twice dif-
ferentiable and welfare is increasing in consumption, u′(ctj) ≡
du/dctj > 0, but at a decreasing rate, u
′′(ctj) ≡ d
2(u)/d(ctj)
2 < 0.20
In every period t, production possibilities can be represent-
ed by a neoclassical aggregate production function F (Kt, Lt)
where Kt and Lt are, respectively, the stock of capital and the
labour supply at t. F is continuous and production displays
constant returns to scale—formally, F is homogeneous of de-
gree one. The labour supply Lt is proportional to population
and normalised to one. Thus, we can define the ratio kt ≡
Kt/Lt, capturing capital per capita and because F is homoge-
neous of degree one we can identify the production function
F (Kt, Lt) = f(Kt/Lt, 1) = f(kt) which describes output per
capita. We assume that the function f is twice differentiable
and capital is necessary to produce output with f(0) = 0. Fur-
thermore, output is increasing in capital per capita albeit a de-
creasing rate: formally, f satisfies f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0.21
It may be argued that the assumptions of identical prefer-
ences and stationary technology are unrealistic and miss some
important dynamic features of capitalist economies. Yet our
purpose is not to explain the determinants of capital accumu-
lation and welfare inequalities. Ours is a normative analysis
of alternative egalitarian benchmarks that aims to identify the
appropriate temporal unit of egalitarian concern. For this pur-
pose, it is appropriate to abstract from the complications aris-
ing from technical progress and, more generally, (irreversible)
20 We also suppose that marginal utility becomes unboundedly large at
very low levels of consumption limc→0 u
′(c) =∞.
21 We also assume that f satisfies the so-called Inada conditions.
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structural changes in the economy. Similarly, assuming all in-
dividuals to be fundamentally alike is both analytically and
normatively appropriate, because it allows us to separate the
issue of the appropriate unit of egalitarian concern from ques-
tions about the currency of egalitarian justice. Furthermore,
this assumption is standard in the literature on intergenera-
tional justice (see, for example, Roemer and Veneziani, 2004;
2007, and the references therein) and it is usually—albeit often
implicitly—made in the debate on CLE.22
For any variable z, let {zt}t=0,1,... denote an infinite sequence
of values of z. We follow Rawls and assume that complete
lives are the relevant temporal unit of normative concern for
the difference principle. For, “Justice as fairness focuses on
inequalities in citizens’ life prospects—their prospects over a
complete life” (Rawls, 2001, 55). Therefore the maximin pro-
gramme (MP) can be written as follows.
max
{ct
1
,ct+1
2
}t=0,1,...
min
t
W (ct1, c
t+1
2 ),
subject to kt+1−kt+ct1+c
t
2 = f(k
t), all t ≥ 0, given k0 and c02.
In other words, given the initial capital stock k0 and the
level of consumption of the generation born in t = −1, the
Rawlsian social planner should choose the lifetime consump-
tion profile of all generations—and therefore the optimal in-
tertemporal path of aggregate capital—in order to maximise
the welfare of the worst off generation.
Propositions 1 and 2provide necessary conditions for amax-
imin solution.
Proposition 1. At the solution to (MP),W (ct1, c
t+1
2 ) = W (c
t+1
1 , c
t+2
2 )
for all t.
In other words, a welfare distribution must satisfy CLE in
order to be themaximin solution. In this sense themaximin cri-
terion poses an efficiency restriction on CLE: the maximin so-
22 Most notably in Daniels’ (1988; 1993; 2008) prudential lifespan account,
whose basic intuitions are based on the idea that individuals are essentially
alike.
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lution is the CL-egalitarian distribution with the highest level
of equal welfare.
Proposition 2. At the solution to (MP), u′(ct1)/u
′(ct+12 ) = β(1 +
f ′(kt+1)), for all t.
By Proposition 2, at the maximin solution, for all dates t,
agents born in tmust attain the highestW (ct1, c
t+1
2 ) given k
j+1,
cj1 and c
j+1
2 , j 6= t. In other words, for all t, given the level
of capital and consumption of all other generations, the differ-
ence principle requires that agents born in t attain the highest
possible lifetime welfare. This suggests that the condition in
Proposition 2 can be derived as the first order condition of a
constrained optimisation problem, defining the optimal con-
sumption allocation along an agent’s life. Given the assump-
tions on u and f , Proposition 2 implies that the maximin so-
lution is unique, while none of the egalitarian criteria identi-
fies per se a particular welfare distribution. However, the main
implication of Proposition 2 for our analysis is that in general
u(ct1) 6= βu(c
t+1
2 ): at a given period, the young and the old will
attain different welfare levels, so that the maximin allocation
will not be SS-egalitarian.
Let ct = ct1 + c
t
2 denote the total consumption of the young
and the elderly at time t. Let ct = c, for all t, denote a generic
constant aggregate consumption level and let cm ≡ f(k0): cm
is the aggregate level of consumption that can be attained in a
given period if (per capita) capital is k0 and there is no accu-
mulation (or decumulation).
Lemma 1. cm is the maximum sustainable aggregate constant con-
sumption.
Lemma 1 provides a natural benchmark for the maximin
path. Let cm2 = c
0
2 and c
m
1 = c
m − cm2 . By Lemma 1, it is
always feasible to choose ct+12 = c
m
2 and c
t
1 = c
m
1 , all t, and
thus no intertemporal path in which any generation attains
a welfare level lower than Wm ≡ W (cm1 , c
m
2 ) can be the max-
imin path. Formally, for any given c02, no distribution in which
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W (ct1, c
t+1
2 ) < W
m ≡ W (cm1 , c
m
2 ), for some t, can solve (MP).
23
Hence, let Rt = f(kt) + kt − ct2 denote the resources avail-
able to the generation born in t, given the capital they have
inherited, kt, and the consumption of the elderly of the previ-
ous generation, ct2. If R
t = R0 then all generations from t on-
wards can reach at leastWm. Consider the following sequence
of maximisation programmes (Pt).
max
ct
1
,ct+1
2
u(ct1) + βu(c
t+1
2 ),
subject to
kt+1 + ct1 ≤ R
t,
f(kt+1) + kt+1 − ct+12 ≥ R
t+1
given Rt, Rt+1.
The programmes Pt allow us to transform the infinite-hori-
zon programme (MP) into an infinite sequence of one-genera-
tion programmes in which the welfare of each generation t is
maximised given a certain path of resources inherited and be-
queathed Rt, Rt+1. The important choice in the solution of the
original maximin programme lies precisely in the choice of the
sequence {Rt}∞t=0.
Let (c∗1, c
∗
2, k
∗) be the solution of any given Pt with R
t =
Rt+1 = R0, where in general k∗ 6= k0. Let V (Rt, Rt+1) de-
note the maximum function associated with Pt: V (R
t, Rt+1)
denotes the maximum level of welfare that generation t can
23 Alternatively, the benchmark path could be the solution to the follow-
ing problem:
max
c1,c2
u(c1) + βu(c2), subject to c1 + c2 = f(k
0)
In this case, the assumption of a given c0
2
would be dropped and the con-
straint c0
2
≥ c2 would be necessary to guarantee equal treatment of the gen-
eration born in t = −1. This choice would include generation t = −1 in
the definition of the just path, allowing for an explicit treatment of the tran-
sition to justice, instead of taking its past consumption choices as given.
However, the main results of this paper would not change.
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attain, given the resources Rt, Rt+1 that it inherited and that it
has to bequeath, respectively. LetW ∗ ≡ W (c∗1, c
∗
2) = V (R
0, R0):
W ∗ denotes the maximumwelfare level that can be attained by
a generation at a stationary path of resources with Rt = R0 all t.
The main theorem can now be proved.
Theorem 1. Let c02 be given. The maximin solution corresponds to
the vector (c∗1, c
∗
2, k
∗) for each generation.
Theorem 1 states that although the maximin principle and
CSE represent different restrictions on CLE, they coincide in
the economy described, since at the solution to MP, all agents
have the same consumption (c∗1, c
∗
2)—and welfare (u(c
∗
1), u(c
∗
2))
—allocation during their lives.24 Thus, if the egalitarian so-
cial planner also adopts an intergenerational maximin crite-
rion, Theorem 1 proves that the two objectives are not in con-
tradiction if CLE or CSE are adopted, while if SSE1 (or SSE2)
is chosen, a trade-off between the two concerns arises.25
Moreover, since themaximin solution coincideswith the al-
location that maximises agents’ utility under a CLE constraint,
the model allows us to introduce some utilitarian concern in
the analysis. Consider, for instance, classical (average or total)
utilitarianism. By Proposition 2, it is more difficult to reconcile
24 With a finite horizon this is not necessarily true. However, the adoption
of the infinite horizon hypothesis is implied by the very nature of the prob-
lem, as there is no reason to restrict the analysis of a normative principle to
an arbitrary, finite number of generations.
25 An anonymous referee has suggested that this result immediately fol-
lows from the assumption of equal utility functions and stationary technol-
ogy, inwhich case “theCSE restriction is redundant, since optimizing actors
will choose the desired intertemporal allocation given only the CLE condi-
tion that each generation receives k∗”. Three points should be noted about
Theorem 1 that cast doubt on these conclusions. First, as is well known
in the literature on Rawls’s just savings principle, the assumptions of iden-
tical utility functions and stationary technology do not necessarily imply
a stationary allocation of consumption, or even welfare (see, for example,
Dasgupta, 1974). Second, there is no CSE restriction in the model: that the
maximin solution is CS-egalitarian is a result of our analysis. Third, it is
misleading to focus on optimising agents in the context of a social plan-
ner problem. For it is the solution of the maximin problem—and therefore
Theorem 1—that identifies k∗. CLE alone is not sufficient to pin down any
specific level of k.
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a utilitarian concern with SSE2 than with CLE or CSE, since
SSE2 does not allow for a constrained welfare-maximising al-
location along agents’ lives. Instead, if SSE1 is adopted, in
principle it is possible for infinitely many generations to reach
a higher welfare level than at the maximin, with only a finite
number of generations falling below it in order to start capital
accumulation. Thus, due to the infinite gain in utility, a utili-
tarianwould prefer the latter distribution to themaximin/CSE
solution. In general, such a distribution might be appealing
(as opposed to CSE or CLE distributions) not because it is SS-
egalitarian but because someCS, or evenCL inequalities can be
outweighed by an infinite gain in utility, all things considered. In
this sense, SSE1 is the only intertemporal egalitarian principle
compatible with sustainedwelfare growth and thus the princi-
ple that can best accommodate utilitarian concerns (although
SS- equality could still imply some welfare loss with respect
to unconstrained utility maximisation). However, this result
derives from the exclusive focus of SSE1 on intratemporal in-
equalities, and thus it should not be seen as a solution to the
equality/growth dilemma, but rather as a way of bypassing it.
The model presented is highly stylised and some caution
is necessary in interpreting the results. While the analysis of
SSE1 does not depend on any particular assumptions, in more
general settings, CLE and CSE will not be equivalent as con-
cerns their relations with other normative principles and the
maximin solution will be neither CS- nor CL-egalitarian.26
However, despite its simplified structure, the model does cap-
ture in vitro some inherent features of the egalitarian views.
As concerns utilitarianism, since CSE and SSE2 distributions
are strict subsets of those withD1 = 0, the CLE lifetimewelfare
level will always be at least as high as the SSE1 and CSE levels.
Moreover, from Proposition 2, it is legitimate to infer that even
in more general settings CLE lifetime welfare would be at least
as high as the SSE2 welfare, since SSE2 does not allow agents
26 However, while Theorem 1 is more sensitive to changes in the assump-
tions, heterogeneous, non additive or non concave preferences, technical
progress or more general production functions would leave Proposition 1
basically unchanged.
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to allocate consumption optimally along their lives. Similarly,
as regards Rawlsian concerns, the above results suggest that in
a more general setting, if the maximin solution was not egali-
tarian, the CLE lifetime welfare level would be at least as close
to it as the CSE level, and the latter in turn would be at least as
close to the maximin as the SSE2 level.
3 Relation with the Literature
Ourdefence ofCSE echoes the elaborations of a small but grow-
ing literature on equality through time, including Gosseries
(2014), Bidadanure (2016), and Daniels (1988, 1993, 2008). In
this section, we briefly discuss their proposals and compare
them to our approach.
Like us, these authors argue that CLE is the essential build-
ing block of any intertemporal egalitarian approach, even
though it should be supplemented with additional restrictions
to deal with ‘changing places egalitarianism’. Gosseries (2014)
has proposed a sufficiency restriction on CLE, according to
which at every point in time along the life of a person, each
should have enough to cover at least their basic needs. For
him, if people are equal over their complete lives but fall be-
low a given welfare threshold at some point in their lives, the
demands of temporal justice are not met. This approach likely
captures some of our intuitions in rejecting extreme simultane-
ous inequalities among agents, but it does not properly address
the issues raised by changing places egalitarianism in scenarios
with less extreme, but still morally relevant inequalities. This
is not surprising because, unlike our corresponding segments
restriction, sufficientarianism is not meant to capture egalitar-
ian intuitions. Indeed, sufficientarianism has explicitly been
proposed as an alternative to egalitarianism and embodies the
intuition that “equality is not, as such, of particular moral im-
portance” (Frankfurt , 1987, 21).
According to Bidadanure (2016), the strong dystopian feel-
ing created by extreme examples of changing places egalitar-
ianism cannot really be captured in a standard welfarist, dis-
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tributive framework. She argues against SSE and claims that
bymoving away from the paradigm of distributive egalitarian-
ism we can find a non-arbitrary complement to CLE focusing
on a relational perspective, according to which people should
be treated as equals.27 She therefore endorses a relational egal-
itarian complement toCLEwhich limits the scope of acceptable
synchronic inequalities.
The relational approach proposed by Bidadanure is inter-
esting and innovative, and it may be an essential component
of a complex, multifaceted approach to egalitarianism. As she
aptly notes, distributive and relational approaches complement
each other as they “simply appeal to different kinds of reasons
to care about inequalities” (Bidadanure, 2016, 238). Nonethe-
less, an emphasis on the relational dimension of egalitarianism
does not provide a complete answer to the equally important
distributive questions. Indeed, her approach leaves the central
questions raised in the literature on the distributive dimension
of temporal inequalities largely unanswered. While acknowl-
edging the relevance of relational considerations for egalitari-
anism, our paper focuses precisely on the appropriate distribu-
tive benchmark.
In a series of seminal contributions, Daniels (1988, 1993,
2008) has argued that both lifetimes and temporal stages of
lives should be taken into account within a Prudential Lifes-
pan Approach. According to him, complete lives remain the key
unit of egalitarian concern but CLE should be constrained by
a prudential procedure to allocate resources between young
and old. To be precise, in the Prudential Lifespan Approach, the
best way of synchronically distributing resources among peo-
ple of different ages should be identified by thinking pruden-
tially about a diachronic distribution across the different tem-
poral stages of a single complete lifetime. As a result, there
may be significant simultaneous inequalities, but this is “not
by itself a form of age-bias. This differential treatment would
not be morally objectionable, . . . , if it made each life go as well
as possible (it was a ‘prudent’ allocation) and if all people were
treated similarly over their whole lives” (Daniels, 2008, 483).
27 See, for example, Anderson (1999).
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Our results in section 2 are consistent with Daniels’ (1988;
1993; 2008) account of intertemporal justice: under the assump-
tions of our model, the prudential lifetime allocation will coin-
cide with the maximin solution. More generally, if agents are
fundamentally alike, and the economic environment does not
undergomajor structural changes, then the prudential lifespan
approach will yield a CS-egalitarian allocation. Nonetheless,
some important differences should be noted. First, Daniels’ can
be considered as a mixed account, which imposes a prudential
—and thereby non-egalitarian—constraint on CLE. In contrast,
in our account, CSE emerges as the appropriate intertemporal
benchmark, based on purely egalitarian considerations. Max-
imin, or prudential considerations are clearly distinguished,
and theoretically subsidiary in our analysis, and therefore—
unlike in Daniels’ (1988; 1993; 2008) account—the defence of
CSE is independent on the specific formulation of maximin,
or prudential accounts.28 In fact, formally, under our assump-
tions, while CSE identifies a set of egalitarian allocations, the
prudential lifespan account picks up one (or a strict subset)
of such allocations. Second, in our model, we do not assume
that the agents, or the social planner, actually act prudentially
subject to a CLE constraint: the fact that the allocation in The-
orem 1 corresponds with the allocation advocated by the pru-
dential lifetime account is a result of amore basic—and norma-
tively well founded, at least within an egalitarian approach—
principle, namely Rawls’s maximin.
In addition to the specific points mentioned above, it is
worth brieflymentioning twomore generalmethodological fea-
tures that differentiate our paper from the literature reviewed
here. First, we clearly distinguish the identification of the ap-
propriate egalitarian benchmark from the choice of a suitable
inequality measure. As we have argued in Section 1, this dis-
tinction is important and it is not always properly spelled out.
Second, we clearly distinguish egalitarian and non-egalitarian
concerns. Our defence of CSE lies entirely on egalitarian prin-
ciples and intuitions, and althoughwedobring non-egalitarian
considerations to bear in Section 2, they are only meant to pro-
28 For a thorough critique, see McKerlie (2012).
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vide additional support for CSE.
4 Conclusion
In this paper three egalitarian views are analysed in the in-
tertemporal context. Once the static setting is abandoned, egal-
itarian principles—apart from differing in the analysis of ex-
isting inequalities,—also define different ideal egalitarian dis-
tributions. While it may be important to use the different in-
formation conveyed by every criterion in the analysis of exist-
ing inequalities, when the egalitarian distributions associated
with them are analysed, CLE and SSE have undesirable fea-
tures while CSE represents the appropriate egalitarian bench-
mark.
The relations between the three egalitarian principles and
othermoral ideals, namelymaximin andutilitarianism, are also
analysed. As regards the maximin principle, Propositions 1-2
and Theorem 1 show that, unlike with CLE and CSE, the adop-
tion of SSE implies a trade off between egalitarianism and a
concern for the worst off. As regards utility, the same conclu-
sion holds if one interprets SSE as a restriction on CLE, since it
yields a lower egalitarian lifetimewelfare level. This is not true
if SSE is analysed per se, but this is just because in this case the
SSE is a strictly intratemporal principle.
In closing this paper, it is worth noting that our formal anal-
ysis yields some interesting insights on a vexed issue in nor-
mative economics, namely the well-known trade-off between
equality and growth. Arrow (1973) and Dasgupta (1974)
proved that if agents are selfish, live for one period, and their
lives do not overlap, then Rawls’ maximin principle implies
a stationary path of consumption, capital and welfare. Our
model yields a more nuanced conclusion and suggests some
interesting directions for further research. In our framework
with overlapping generations, at themaximin solution the path
of capital must be chosen so as to maximise lifetime welfare
and, under quite general assumptions, this implies growth in
at least one period. In other words, although the application
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of the maximin principle precludes permanent growth in the
economy, as inArrow (1973) andDasgupta (1974), the dynam-
ics of the economy is not completely stationary.
Our conjecture is that an explicit and more realistic analy-
sis of the temporal structure of agents’ lives (which span over
many periods), and the overlaps across generations, together
with the introduction of uncertainty and irreversibility of in-
vestments may alter the justice/growth trade-off.29 This in-
dicates a promising line for further research on intertemporal
and intergenerational justice.
Appendix
For any variable z, let dz = z′ − z denote a change in z.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let W ∗ be the value of MP and suppose that, contrary to the
statement,W (c01, c
1
2) > W
∗. By continuity, there is a sufficiently
small dc01 < 0, such that W (c
′0
1, c
1
2) > W
∗, −dk1 = dc01 and
the amount of resources available in t = 1 increases by [1 +
f ′(k1)]dk1. Let dc11 = f
′(k1)dk1 > 0 and dk2 = dk1 and repeat
the procedure for all t ≥ 2 so that dct1 = f
′(kt)dkt > 0, dkt+1 =
dkt > 0, andW (c′t1, c
t+1
2 ) > W
∗, all t, a contradiction. The proof
of the case withW (ct1, c
t+1
2 ) > W
∗, some t > 0, is similar.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose not. Then there is dct1, dc
t+1
2 such that dc
t+1
2 = −[1 +
f ′(kt+1)]dct1 and u
′(ct1)dc
t
1+βu
′(ct+12 )dc
t+1
2 > 0. By the concavity
of W , this implies W (c′t1, c
′t+1
2 ) > W (c
t
1, c
t+1
2 ) leaving unmodi-
fied cj1, all j 6= t and k
j , cj2, all j 6= t + 1, violating Proposition
1.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Consider c > cm. At t = 0, k1 < k0 and thus k2− k1 = k1− k0+
f(k1)−f(k0) < 0 and k2−k1 < k1−k0, i.e. |k2−k1|/|k1−k0| > 1,
29 A similar point is made by Silvestre (2002), albeit in a rather different
formal setting.
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and, by induction |kt+1 − kt|/|kt − kt−1| > 1. Therefore kt = 0
for t finite, and c is not sustainable.
Proof of Theorem 1.
1. The existence and uniqueness of (c∗1, c
∗
2, k
∗) is guaranteed
by the assumptions on u and f . Note also that (c∗1, c
∗
2, k
∗)
satisfies the condition in Propositions 1 and 2.
2. Suppose it is possible to raise the welfare of all genera-
tions above W ∗. Consider P0: by construction the first
generation’s welfare can increase over W ∗ if and only if
R1 < R0. Consider nowgeneration 2: clearly V (R1, R0) <
W ∗. Moreover V (Rt, Rt+1) is concave and its iso- welfare
contours have slope [1+f ′(k(Rt, Rt+1))], where k(Rt, Rt+1)
is the optimum value of kt+1 from Pt. Hence,W (c
1
1, c
2
2) >
W ∗ impliesR2 < R0, with |R2−R0| > [1+f ′(k(R0, R0))]|R1−
R0|. Iterating the argument, W (ct1, c
t+1
2 ) > W
∗ implies
|Rt+1 − R0|/|Rt − R0| > [1 + f ′(k(R0, R0))], all t, and the
path violates the non- negativity of Rt at some finite t.
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